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Introduction
Companies make promises from the day they are registered. Their brand, their marketing
promises, and their promises for change when faults are discovered all pile up to a list of
guarantees made to the public. While the financial statements of companies are verified by
third-party auditors for fraud, the non-financial information released by companies is not
required to be verified. While companies also promise various results, many don’t follow up on
these results which can lead to public scandals or loss of public faith in corporations. Corporate
social responsibility reporting (hereafter referred to as CSR) is a corporation's assessment of the
company’s effects on issues related to social and environmental responsibility. Monitoring and
reporting the CSR efforts of companies is more important in the modern day than ever because in
recent years, the public faith in corporations has seen a steady decline. With this public decline in
confidence, it is becoming increasingly important for companies to prove their credibility. While
credibility is not an easy thing to prove, there are ways for companies to hold themselves
accountable to the public. One of the most effective ways for companies to prove their credibility
can come from standardized reporting that can be compared among companies and third party
verification of the information in CSR reports.
Background
Modern companies gather, analyze, and report a great amount of data through the use of
accounting. Companies gather information for corporate social reporting and corporate social
performance measurement increasingly over the years.1 Companies are also increasingly
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directing their strategies around their corporate social performance, but they still fall short of full
transparency with their reporting. While many companies hire accounting companies to look into
their corporate social responsibility and have the data for it, the data is rarely published and
verified publicly. To combat this, firms have been employing accounting firms to not only to
audit companies financial statements, but to audit their efforts in global responsibility,
environmental impacts, social impacts, etc.
Based on studies done on the impacts of corporate social performance on company profitability,
it is beneficial for companies to report their social performance to investors and the public.2
From the financial statements in a company’s mandatory financial reporting to the management’s
discussion, and analysis--management’s public explanation of the company’s
performance--companies try to increase their levels of transparency to shareholders and the
public without compromising their competitiveness. This recent increase in transparency is a
result of the ever decreasing level of trust between corporations and the public. According to the
Edelman trust barometer, over 50% of people don’t trust institutions, and the levels of distrust
have been rising steadily from the beginning of the study.3 From the accounting scandals in the
1990s to the social scandals throughout the 2000s, the public trusts corporations less than ever,
making it difficult for companies to succeed in a field where trust is a major component.
Social responsibility generally becomes a focus for companies following scandals. In the event
of a scandal, companies tend to increase their transparency and make promises to change their
social impacts in some way, but the results are not always long lasting. In this paper, we will
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look at two case studies on companies that have experienced corporate social responsibility
scandals, their promises as a result of these scandals, and how these promises were developed.
From here, recommendations will be made for how companies can monitor their corporate social
responsibility through resources they are likely to already have before neglect turns into scandal.
Nike Case Study
Nike is a company in the shoe and apparel industry. Its business strategy focuses primarily
around low-cost innovative sports gear sold at optimal pricing. Nike’s operations include 490
factories in 52 countries.4 Nike operates through outsourcing its shoe and apparel manufacturing.
It has a trusting relationship with its shoe manufacturers, even though its shoe factories are
independent contract manufacturers. Nike has a relationship with many of its shoe manufacturers
due to consistent partnerships and able to quickly negotiate the testing and turnaround of
different shoe innovations. While Nike’s shoe manufacturers remain stable and constant through
the years, its apparel manufacturers are constantly changing based on costs, style demand, etc.
Because of the fluctuating nature of the apparel industry, Nike’s relationship with its apparel
manufacturers is not as trusting and consistent as its relationship with its shoe manufacturers.
This leads to difficulty regulating the operations within the third-party manufacturers. Because of
this, Nike was hit with a series of corporate social responsibility scandals throughout the 1990s
that shaped its company's image for a time. Currently, there is no regulation for company
accountability to their third party subcontractors, but there is an expectation that companies
operate through ethical procedures even within third party contracting. In this case study review,
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we will look at three separate corporate social responsibility scandals in Nike’s history, how
Nike responded to the scandals, and how its responses were followed up.
One of the early Nike social responsibility scandals involved low wages in Indonesia. In the
early 1990s, various NGOs and labor activists began reporting on the low wages being paid to
the workers in a factory owned by one of Nike’s Korean contractors. Because of Nike’s
increased presence in Indonesia, its relationship with those contractors was increasingly
scrutinized. Many of the workers at the factories were not even being paid the minimum wage of
$1 a day because of “hardship” exemptions that the government granted to factories who claimed
inability to pay minimum wage. The minimum wage of $1 a day was estimated by the
government to cover around 70% of the needs for an individual as it was. Initially, Nike ignored
the reports, claiming they were not responsible for the management of its independent third-party
contractors. As the scandal became increasingly harmful to its image though, Nike instructed its
contractors to stop applying for the minimum wage exception. As more time passed and it
became clear that simply instructing its contractors to stop applying for minimum wage was not
enough to be considered socially responsible, Nike increased its corporate social responsibility
efforts. Nike promised to raise its contractors wages above minimum wage to
$26.00-$37.50/month and to monitor its third party contractor wages.5 Overall, in the case of
Indonesia, Nike had a rough start but over time incorporated its corporate social responsibility to
its company strategy.
Nike’s next large CSR scandal took place in Pakistan. One of the highest quality producers of
soccer balls is located in Sailkot, Pakistan. Around 70% of the world’s high quality soccer balls
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are made in Sailkot.6 “Homework” is a practice that was popular in the area in the 1990s and led
to many well-known human rights issues. In 1996, Life magazine published a photograph and an
article of a 12 year old boy hand-stitching a soccer ball. The photo and article caused a wave of
criticism against Nike for employing child labor. According to the vice president of compliance
at Nike at the time, Dusty Kidd, Nike was already working with the supplier to eliminate the use
of homework and to become more accountable for its employees. After the wave of criticism hit,
Nike signed the Atlanta Agreement, implementing a program to eliminate child labor from the
soccer ball through International Labor Organization (ILO) monitoring, social protections, and
training of other-income generating activities. Also in accordance with this agreement, any plant
caught employing a child is required to remove the child, but continue paying its wages up to
when they reach working age. According to ILO reports, many of these companies continue
employing children and production has moved to the less regulated surrounding areas of Pakistan
in order to go around this regulation.
The third global scandal for Nike involved health and safety problems in Vietnam. In 1997, an
Ernst & Young report paid for by Nike was leaked to an NGO and subsequently made public.
This report showed that Nike’s Tae Kwang Vina factory had Toulene concentrations from 6-177
times the acceptable standards in certain sections of the plant. Toulene is a chemical that causes
various skin and eye irritations along with liver and kidney damage and central nervous system
depression. The scandal was made worse when it was brought to attention that the UN
Ambassador, Andrew Young had visited the plant recently before the report yet had not
mentioned any health problems. To combat the negative publicity Nike was receiving for all of
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its CSR scandals, it formulated a code of conduct to be followed by all of its supplier factories.
Companies working with Nike were obligated to sign its code of conduct as well as an agreement
to abide by the laws of OSHA. Nike also created new departments to combat its ever growing
global problems. Its compliance department was moved into its apparel branch to combat the
problems where most of them appear. It also created an incentive system for managers to
improve environmental and labor conditions through implementing a Manufacturing Index.7 A
manufacturing index provides measures for evaluating the environmental and social performance
of companies and acts as Nike’s measurement of corporate social responsibility for their third
party subcontractors.
In order to publicly be held accountable for the promises made regarding its global corporate
social responsibility, Nike designated internal employees as well as hired third parties such as
PWC to audit its supplier’s factories. Nike employs 85 people specifically designated for labor
and environmental compliance and conducts inspections by managers weekly or monthly
depending on the company size and use frequency. In the early 2000s, the world watched as Nike
embraced corporate social responsibility and went from the face of social corruption to an
accountable company that continued and even grew in success. Since these scandals, Nike has
been successfully monitoring its third-party suppliers and has eliminated petroleum based
chemicals in footwear productions. While there are still imperfections in Nike’s social
responsibility, it made its CSR position clear to the public through exponentially increasing its
social monitoring and reporting since the 1990’s.
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Volkswagen Case Study
Similarly to Nike, Volkswagen (Hereafter known as VW) encountered a corporate social
responsibility scandal that brought its public image down. In September of 2015, the California
Air Resources Board began testing cars on the road. These tests led to the stunning discovery
that VW diesel cars emitted more than 40 times the regulation threshold for nitrogen oxide.8 An
investigation was launched by the EPA and it was discovered that VW had equipped its cars with
deceptive software to cheat through the inaccurate lowering of emissions during emissions tests.
Because of this, VW experienced immense economic downturn with a net loss of $1.4 billion.
Car sales, stock value, and company value all plummeted and VW was suspended from the Dow
Jones Index.
So how could a company with such a strong standing go through such a terrible scandal?
According to the case done by Jung and Park, it was “austere leadership styles, insular corporate
governance, and drawbacks from family feuds and nepotism,” that led to such a hostile corporate
environment.9 The CEO at the time, Ferdinand Piech, was notorious for having a toxic leadership
style that reflected an “at any cost” mindset throughout the corporate leadership. The board for
the company was ruled with a majority by the Porsche and Piech families who made all decisions
amongst themselves without consideration of other board members. Volkswagen had set its bets
on diesel when many companies were investing in technology. Finding it difficult to keep up
with the Obama administration’s environmental regulation, Martin Winterkorn, the interim CEO
changed the company focus to simply meeting the environmental standards at any cost.
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Volkswagen faced many economic and political consequences through recalls and lawsuits. In
response to the scandal, VW changed its entire managerial system promising maximum
transparency.10 Before the scandal, the company published public CSR reports focusing on their
efforts in sustainability, diversity, and environmental health.While this information was
published, it was not verified by outside sources. If the Volkswagen CSR was verified by third
parties, there is a chance that the auditors may have caught the defeat devices prior to the scandal
occurrence. If auditors tested the vehicles using different methods than Volkswagen, as the
California Air Resources Board did, they would have seen the extremely high output of nitrogen
oxide from the vehicles.
Since the scandal, it does not appear that VW is keeping up with the promises immediately
following it. In a recent article from Forbes, shareholders are demanding more transparency, but
VW is deflecting.11 Volkswagen reacted to the demand for an increase in transparency by
making promises and fixing the problem at hand, but how does that affect the public trust in the
company? Measuring public trust through stock pricing, its stock reached its 5 year peak on
April 10th, 2015 at a price of $253.20 prior to the scandal and bottomed out on October 2nd
2015 at 92.36 after the scandal was discovered publicly. The stock is currently around $163
which means that it is slowly climbing back from the scandal, but there is still clear hesitancy in
the market to bring Volkswagen’s pricing back to post-scandal pricing.While Volkswagen
implemented corporate social reporting even before its scandal, there was no third-party check to
verify the information. Because of this, even the implementation of its CSR was ineffective in
preventing this scandal.
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Summary of Case Studies

Nike

Volkswagen

Time Frame Studied

1889-2001

2006-2017

Scandal Perpetrator

Nike overseas third party subcontractors

Volkswagen management and
engineers

Initial Response

Ignore - Third party CSR is not the
responsibility of the company

Ignore - Blame the problem on
rogue engineers

Long Term Response Hiring department for CSR

Management change

Publishing public CSR Reports

Increase in CSR reporting

Having third party verification of CSR
reports

Recall cars and pay off car owners
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Literary Review
Why does fraud occur? In a study done about media coverage as an influence on accounting
scandals and CSR, it was discovered that fraud may occur due to managerial negligence, a lack
of segregation of duties, and insufficient monitoring through third party verification.12 In the
cases of Nike and Volkswagen, there were clear problems with management, negligence, and
insufficient monitoring. While both companies hire accounting firms to audit their financial
statements, Nike also utilized their accounting professionals to monitor and report their social
performance. This extra step in CSR implementation gives Nike the advantage of transparency
and knowing where it stands in corporate social responsibility which allows Nike to foresee any
negligence in its CSR and fix it before scandal occurs.
Following scandals, many companies will switch out their management, as seen in the case of
Volkswagen, but will not follow up on their other CSR promises, usually consisting of increased
monitoring and actual change in the company managerial style. While this may be difficult to
follow up on, it is very important. If the management of a company is changed but the
managerial style and actions remain the same, is the company really less likely to fall to the same
scandals that caused the initial change? With growth in the number of scandals, the public trust
in corporations only declines with time. As public trust in corporations declines, it becomes more
important to have third party verification of the corporation’s reports. Third party verification
(usually in the form of an audit) helps ensure the accuracy of data and controls. Controls are the
internal systems in place to ensure accurate reporting. The decreasing level of trust in corporate
promises not only affects the companies neglecting their social performance, but all companies.
12
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Social misconducts not only arouse negative investor reactions to the company committing the
misconduct, but to rival companies as well.13 This means that the effect of a scandal in any
industry has a ripple effect from the company caught in the scandal, to all other companies in the
industry.
With the rise of globalization and increase in complexity in technology, it has become
increasingly difficult to hold companies accountable for any damages they cause. The topic of
corporate social responsibility is widely debated not because professionals disagree on whether
corporations should be held responsible for their actions, but because there is disagreement on
how responsible companies are for the less direct impacts of their actions. There is no
standardization on corporate social responsibility as of 2018 in the United States, although there
is CSR standardization in the International Accounting Standards Board (the accounting
standards predominantly used by European and Asian countries). The board that sets the
accounting principles used in the United States has been trying to merge US with international
accounting standards for years. Including CSR standardization in corporate annual reports that
are audited may bring the U.S. standards one step closer to consolidation with international
standards. Additionally, having data in corporate annual reports that is audited by independent
third parties would help keep companies accountable for their impacts on societies and the
environment.
From older papers such as “The corporate social performance–financial performance link,” to
newer CSR papers such as “How does corporate social responsibility contribute to firm financial
performance?14 The mediating role of competitive advantage, reputation, and customer
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satisfaction” research consistently links corporate social responsibility to beneficial financial
performance to three corporate characteristics. The three main characteristics of strategic CSR
are issues, organization, and communication. Companies implementing CSR must consider the
issues as well as the scope of the issues they may be faced with. Some examples of issues are
child labor and environmental issues. Thesis issues vary widely in impact and in measurement
methodology, but there are ways to measure each of them. In our case studies, Nike was faced
with child labor and other social issues while Volkswagen was faced with environmental issues.
Companies must also decide how their CSR fits within their organization. How much will the
company focus its strategy around being globally responsible? Nike greatly incorporated CSR
through focusing whole groups of employees around CSR and through hiring its accounting
firms to audit CSR impacts. Volkswagen chose not to focus on CSR at all and to ride out the
scandal. Standardization of CSR reporting would make it mandatory for companies to include
CSR in their company strategy at least to a certain extent.
Lastly, organizations must decide how much CSR will impact their branding strategy. Both Nike
and Volkswagen’s strategies are focused around social responsibility for their branding. Both
companies market being socially responsible. These three characteristics of CSR have been
linked to both Nike and Volkswagen’s strategies, but these companies don’t necessarily act on
CSR the same way. While Nike actively monitors and published its CSR impact, Volkswagen
remains a shot in the dark. Nike incorporates third party verification in the form of audits to their
CSR reports whereas Volkswagen publishes their own, unchecked results.
When choosing an internal or external branding strategy, companies must answer the three
questions on their CSR characteristics. They must decide how much of their resources they will
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contribute to their CSR. These stances impact company reactions to CSR scandals they come
across as well. Promises made as a result of scandals help companies decide what issues to focus
on, how these promises will impact their organizations, and how their short-term branding
strategy will be affected by their social responsibility stance. Companies increasing their focus
on CSR must consider methods for monitoring their CSR impact.
One of the more commonly occuring monitoring methods of CSR in the modern day is hiring
professional accounting firms to monitor CSR.15 Accounting and CSR have been linked through
auditing practices as seen in the case of Nike. Accounting firms were hired by Nike to externally
audit its overseas factories and provide an “unbiased” report of its compliance with Nike’s code
of conduct. While not all factories were compliant, raising the monitoring increases Nike’s
understanding of what was working and what was not. Raising the level of monitoring in CSR is
the first step to increasing social responsibility in any case and helped Nike begin to increase its
global responsibility. This, in turn, brought it to number 87 on the Reputation Institute’s list of
companies with the best CSR reputations in the world in 2017. Volkswagen was number 100 on
the list in 2017.16
While the companies have both gained back their reputations since their scandals, Volkswagen is
more likely to fall into another scandal based on its lack of change in their corporate social
accountability and culture. Nike is less likely to have another scandal because of its transparency.
Hiring third party auditors to look over corporate social reports allows Nike the comfort of
knowing that it is doing everything it can to be responsible as a company.
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According to a paper written by Angus Duff and Guo Xin, it has become more common practice
for large corporations to hire professional accounting firms to oversee their CSR.17 In fact,
accounting firms are beginning to implement methods and strategies for monitoring CSR for
companies as a part of their business model. Whether a company hires an accounting firm to
monitor their CSR or decides to monitor internally, it is important that companies have methods
of monitoring and reporting CSR.
Recommendations
I will not argue that management in companies should be more strictly standardized because that
takes away the freedoms of companies to make their own corporate decisions. I do think that the
impact that companies have on society and the environment, whether direct or indirect, should be
considered within their decision making processes. The standardization of CSR reporting may
take corporations a step closer to global responsibility through the creation of reports that are
comparable to other companies within their industry and easily verified. My recommendations
for the use of accounting within CSR are as follows:
● Include CSR in accounting reporting through inclusion of an audited section in the annual
report. (Similar to overseas accounting standards IFRS)
● Create standardization for CSR reporting for comparable reporting
● Create a private sector for CSR rulemaking overruled by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Based on the research, there are a few key factors are at fault in studied scandals, whether they
are financial or social scandals. There are issues with management not having guidelines to serve

17

Duff, Angus, and Xin Guo

17

as a boundary in the case of CSR. Including an audited section for CSR in annual accounting
reports would help public companies be socially responsible through the release of public-third
party audited information. Auditing is the act of an independent third party verifying the
accuracy of information. While this would be difficult to implement initially, over time, report
styles could be developed for sectors with similar issues to help standardize the reporting. Larger
accounting firms such as PWC and EY have already begun implementing methods for CSR
auditing. Currently, accounting firms are used to audit financial information, but there is no
verification of non-financial information. Including a section for CSR in companies annual
reports would allow the information to be public and would make it simple for accounting firms
to simply audit an additional section of the report.
The second recommendation is based on a lack of standardization in CSR reporting currently that
makes it difficult to compare corporate responsibility among companies. If companies were
given a general guideline on how to create their reports, it would be simple for auditors and the
public to understand the contents of the reports across companies. The last recommendation also
follows the standardization of accounting principles with a standardization “board” that oversees
the guideline setting in CSR. There is currently no group or writing that acts as to standardize
CSR. Within financial reporting, the financial accounting standards board (hereafter referred to
as FASB) was created in order to set rules for accounting standards as they changed. Since
FASB is a private board overseen by the government, it contains accounting specialists who are
able to create rules that are befitting to financial situations and are still regulated. Creating a
private board for CSR would allow specialists to set standards for corporate reporting on social
issues. CSR has been developed over the years into a well-used and important part of the way
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companies function, but some companies still refuse to allow their social responsibility to impact
their decision making promises. Because of the lack of regard for social responsibility by some
companies, especially following public scandals, it is difficult for the public to trust the promises
of companies who have made publicly known mistakes in their social responsibility. As
companies like Nike have shown, through systematic monitoring, transparent reporting, and
external oversight, it is possible for companies to regain the public’s trust and be successful.
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